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Designing the Decider 
EMILY s. BREMER* 
ABSTRACT 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) contains several provisions designed 
to ensure that presiding officials in so-called formal adjudications are able to 
make fair, well-informed, independent decisions. But these provisions do not 
apply to the vast majority of federal adjudicatory hearings. In this world of 
adjudication outside the APA, agencies enjoy broad procedural discretion, 
including substantial freedom to "design the decider." This Article defines the 
scope of this discretion and explores how various agencies have exercised it. 
The discussion is enriched by examples drawn from an expansive new database 
of federal adjudicatory procedures. The Article argues that, although agency 
discretion to design the decider has benefits, it also imperils independent 
decision making, destroys government-wide uniformity, and undermines 
transparency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Studying federal administrative adjudication on a system-wide basis is a 
daunting endeavor. Few agencies conduct proceedings according to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's (APA) adjudication provisions. 1 Most proceedings are 
not subject to this legal framework and are conducted according to procedures 
tailor-made to suit the specific needs of the adjudicating agency and the relevant 
program. Congress sometimes cultivates these tailored processes by enacting 
agency- or program-specific procedural requirements.2 But even when Congress 
is involved, agencies bear much of the responsibility for crafting the details of 
their own, unique adjudicatory processes. This reality is facilitated by a funda-
mental administrative law principle that affords agencies broad discretion over 
their own procedures. 3 The exercise of this procedural discretion has yielded 
breathtaking variety across the hundreds of adjudicatory programs that exist 
throughout the federal government. Perhaps as a consequence, most scholars 
who study administrative adjudication focus on a particular agency, program, or 
procedural device. Doing so is necessary to make the endeavor manageable. 
This Article examines a narrow but important component of federal adminis-
trative adjudication: the rules that define the nature, position, and powers of the 
officials who preside over hearings.4 As with other aspects of administrative 
procedure, agencies have broad discretion to make these rules, i.e., to "design 
the decider." To help explore the scope and exercise of this discretion, this 
Article draws on a recent government-wide study of adjudication that was 
commissioned by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) 
and funded in part by Stanford Law School. 5 In addition to a report authored by 
Professor Michael Asimow,6 the Conference's researcher, this study produced 
an ACUS recommendation 7 and a publicly available online database of the 
procedures observed in hundreds of federal adjudicatory programs. 8 Examples 
l. See 5 U.S.C. § 554, 556, 557 (2012). 
2. See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA's Adjudication Provisions to 
All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1003, 1006 (2004). 
3. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,524 (1978). 
4. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAv1s L. REv. 1643 (2016). 
5. ACUS is a free-standing federal agency that studies administrative procedure and makes recommen-
dations for improvement to other agencies, the President, Congress, and the Judicial Conference. See 5 
U.S.C. §§ 591-96 (2012). The agency is composed of 100 members drawn from government and the 
private sector, headed by a chairman who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. Recommendations are developed through a research-driven, consensus-based process and 
are adopted by the full Assembly (i.e., the whole membership) during semi-annual plenary sessions. See 
ADMIN. CoNF. OF THE U.S., https://www.acus.gov/about-administrative-conference-united-states-acus 
[https://perma.cc/2QRM-NUQM]. 
6. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, EvIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (2016), 
https :/ /www. acus. gov/ sites/default/files/ documents/ adj udication-outside-the-adminis trati ve-
procedure-act-final-report_ O. pdf [https://perma.cc/DH76-J7NM]. 
7. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
8. See ADJUDICATION RESEARCH: JOINT PROJECT OF ACUS AND STAN. L. ScH. [hereinafter ADJUDICATION 
RESEARCH], https://acus.law.stanford.edu/ [https://perma.cc/PS67-GPMF]. 
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drawn from this database illustrate the broad variation that results from the 
exercise of agency discretion to design the decider. This Article argues that, 
although this discretion has benefits, it also undermines decision-maker indepen-
dence, government-wide uniformity, and transparency. These costs deserve 
greater attention. 
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 
Federal administrative adjudication is traditionally divided into only two 
types: "formal" adjudication, which is conducted in accord with the APA's 
adjudication provisions9 and "informal" adjudication, for which the APA does 
not provide specific procedural requirements. 10 Although widely used, these 
terms are problematic. One difficulty is that so-called informal adjudication is 
often conducted according to procedures that are as or more formal (in the 
colloquial sense of "trial-like") than the procedures specified by the APA's 
"formal" adjudication provisions. 11 Moreover, the vast majority of agency 
adjudication is "informal." Even before the APA's 1946 enactment, informal 
adjudication was referred to as "the life blood of the administrative process," a 
description that remains accurate to this day. 12 Although ubiquitous, this "life 
blood" is profoundly non-uniform. In sum, the category of "informal" adjudica-
tion is so vast and various that treating it as a monolithic whole obscures more 
than it reveals. 
For these reasons, this Article will eschew the traditional formal-informal 
dichotomy in favor of a classification scheme developed by Professor Michael Asimow 
and used in his recent study of administrative adjudication conducted for the ACUS. 13 
9. See 5 U.S.C. § 554,556,557 (2012). 
10. E.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 873 F.2d 325, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that "no provision of the APA contains specific procedures to govern an informal agency 
adjudication"); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 739, 
744 (1976) ("[A]dministrative decision making labeled here as informal adjudication is largely unad-
dressed procedurally by the APA .... "). 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2012), which addresses "ancillary matters," 
such as the right to counsel for those compelled to appear before an agency, may be relevant in some 
informal adjudications. See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND PLACEMENT OF ADJUDICATORS IN THE FEDERAL 
SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 35 (Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC REPORT], https://www.acus.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/FINAL%20EEOC%20Final%20Report%20%5B3-31- l 4%5D.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/CYN7-6TZH]. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. § 558 (2012) may also "provide some meager protections in these 
cases." Asimow, supra note 2, at 1006 n.16. 
II. See AsIMow, supra note 6, at 3. 
12. Verkuil, supra note 10, at 744 (quoting ArTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE, FINAL REPORT 35 (1941)). 
13. See AsIMow, supra note 6; see also Asimow, supra note 2, at 1005-06 (introducing the 
classification scheme). 
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Professor Asimow's scheme divides administrative adjudication into three 
categories: 
• Type A Adjudication includes agency adjudications that are conducted 
in accordance with the APA's adjudication provisions. 14 
• Type B Adjudication includes proceedings that are conducted outside of 
the APA's adjudication provisions, but are subject to some legal require-
ment (imposed by statute, regulation, or executive order) that a decision 
be issued following an evidentiary hearing. 15 An "evidentiary hearing" 
is "a proceeding [in] which the parties make evidentiary submissions, 
have an opportunity to rebut testimony and arguments made by the 
opposition, and to which the exclusive record principle applies." 16 
Under the "exclusive record principle," the decider "is confined to 
considering inputs from the parties (as well as matters officially noticed) 
when determining factual issues." 17 
• Type C Adjudication includes proceedings that are neither conducted in 
accord with the APA's adjudication provisions nor subject to any other 
legal requirement for an evidentiary hearing. 18 
Type A adjudication is the category traditionally referred to as "formal" 
adjudication. 19 Together, Type B and Type C adjudication form the category 
traditionally referred to as "informal" adjudication. Avoiding that term, this 
Article will occasionally refer to Types B and C together as "non-APA" 
adjudication or "adjudication outside of the APA. "20 
For several interrelated reasons, this Article will focus on the scope and 
exercise of agency discretion in Type B proceedings. First, the category of Type 
A adjudication is relatively small, procedurally uniform, and has been well 
studied.2 1 In contrast, and as previously noted, most administrative adjudication 
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 554, 556, and 557 (2012). See generally AsJMow, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining 
the three categories of agency adjudication). 
15. See As1Mow, supra note 6, at 2, 10. 
16. Id. at 4, 10. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 2; see also id. at 4 ("In the case of Type C adjudication ... no evidentiary hearing is legally 
required, and usually no such hearing occurs."'). 
19. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 10. 
20. See As1Mow, supra note 6. The notion of adjudication conducted "outside of the APA" might 
strike some as peculiar given that there are provisions of the APA that are frequently cited as governing 
informal adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555, 558 (2012); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655 (1990) ("The determination in this case ... was lawfully made by informal 
adjudication, the minimal requirements for which are set forth in § 555 of the APA."). Although these 
provisions may have some relevance in non-APA adjudication, they by no means provide an adjudica-
tive analog to the APA's informal rulemaking provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
21. See As1Mow, supra note 6, at 2. 
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is conducted outside of the APA. 22 Second, the scope of agency discretion-and 
therefore the range of procedural variation-is greater in non-APA adjudication 
than it is in Type A adjudication. 23 This is because the APA establishes uniform 
procedural requirements for Type A proceedings, but does not do so for Type B 
and Type C proceedings. Although Type A adjudication offers a useful, fixed 
point of comparison, non-APA adjudication is in greater need of examination. 
Finally, there is significantly more information available about Type B adjudica-
tion than there is about Type C adjudication. ACUS's recent study comprehen-
sively catalogues Type A and Type B proceedings, offering a rich source of 
data.24 Focusing on Type B proceedings takes advantage of this reality and 
confines the project to a manageable scope. 
II. AGENCY DISCRETION TO DESIGN THE DECIDER 
Agencies generally have broad discretion to design the procedures they 
observe, including in adjudicatory proceedings. The Constitution's Due Process 
Clause, the APA, and other statutes establish minimum procedural requirements. 
Provided that agencies observe these minimum requirements, however, courts 
typically afford agencies substantial leeway to determine what procedures they 
will follow. In Type A proceedings, the APA requires that "the agency," "one or 
more members of the body which comprises the agency," or an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) must preside over the taking of evidence. 25 This requirement 
does not apply, however, to adjudications conducted outside of the APA. Thus, 
in the Type B proceedings with which this Article is particularly concerned, a 
non-AU adjudicator may preside. The agency has substantial latitude to design 
the identity and powers of this "decider."26 This Part situates this procedural 
discretion within the more familiar aspects of administrative discretion before 
exploring the ways in which it is exercised. 
22. See, e.g., AsIMow, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that Type C adjudications are "vastly more 
numerous than Type B"'). 
23. The variation among agencies is staggering. E.g., James E. Moliterno, The Administrative 
Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1191, 1196 (2006) ("[T]he role of the 
administrative judge is not merely complex in its generic form, but also varies further from agency to 
agency, taking into account the unique mission, history, and political setting of each agency."). 
24. See AsIMow, supra note 6, at 2 ("The database contains information about all of the schemes of 
Type A and Type B federal agency adjudication (with the exceptions of military and foreign affairs 
adjudication, which were omitted because of resource constraints)."). 
25. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012). 
26. This Article uses the terms "decider," "presider," and "adjudicator" interchangeably. As Section 
B.l. explains, however, this person's title is one of the many elements over which agencies have 
discretion. And so, there is considerable variety in the terminology across agencies that conduct Type B 
proceedings. 
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A. Taking Account of Procedural Discretion 
Discussions of administrative discretion often focus on agencies' substantive 
discretion in the realm of statutory interpretation and policy making. 27 The 
subject arises most often in the context of the doctrines that determine the scope 
of judicial deference to agency decision making. This is because administrative 
discretion resides in the space created by judicial deference. 28 Particularly 
relevant in this respect is the Chevron doctrine, according to which courts defer 
to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute the agency is responsible 
for administering. 29 Chevron is the undisputed star in the vast body of case law 
and scholarly literature addressing the two-sided coin of judicial deference and 
administrative discretion. A recent article reports that the case for which the 
doctrine is named "has been cited in more than 80,000 sources available on 
Westlaw, including in roughly 15,000 judicial decisions and nearly 18,000 law 
review articles and other secondary sources."30 The sheer volume of these 
citations suggests the overwhelming attention given to substantive discretion in 
administration. 
Often overlooked is that agencies also have substantial procedural discretion. 
In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court affirmed "that the formulation of 
procedures [is] basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which 
Congress ha[s] confided the responsibility for substantive judgments."31 Ver-
mont Yankee is best known for establishing the principle that courts should not 
impose upon agencies procedural requirements beyond those that Congress has 
created by statute. The Court also recognized, however, that agencies are not 
similarly constrained. Although the courts lack authority to impose different or 
additional procedures on agencies, agencies may choose to impose such proce-
dures on themselves. 32 This is one consequence of the "very basic tenet of 
administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of 
procedure."33 In short, agency procedural discretion resides in Vermont Yankee's 
27. See Emily S. Bremer & Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee's White Space, 
32 J. LAND UsE & ENvT'L. L. 523 (2017). But see Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 
HARV. L. REv. 1890, 1919 (2016) (defending judicial deference to agency procedural decisions). 
28. See Peter Strauss, 'Deference' Is Too Confusing: Let's Call Them 'Chevron Space' and 'Skid-
more Weight,' 112 CoLuM. L. REv. 1143 (2012). 
29. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
30. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 M1CH. L. REv. 1, 1 
(2017). 
31. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978). 
32. See, e.g., New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, 753 F. Supp. 2d 103, 121 (D.D.C. 2010) 
("Agencies are, of course, free to adopt additional procedures as they see fit."). 
33. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543; see also 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012) ("Each agency is granted the 
authority necessary to comply with the requirements of this subchapter through the issuance of rules or 
otherwise."). Agencies often exercise this discretion to provide more procedure than is legally required. 
See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 859 (2009); Vermeule, supra note 
27, at 1024-26. 
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"white space."34 
Agency procedural discretion often extends to the full range of issues that 
arise in administering adjudicatory programs, from the decision of whether to 
adjudicate to the nature of the proceeding to the details of the procedures that 
will be observed. At the highest level, an agency may be able to choose whether 
to develop policy through rulemaking or adjudication. 35 Thus, the question of 
whether to adjudicate at all may be one the agency is authorized to answer. An 
agency that adjudicates will usually also have the authority to determine the 
nature or type of the proceeding. 36 The first question here is whether the 
agency's governing statute requires a Type A proceeding.37 This is a matter of 
statutory interpretation, and courts typically afford Chevron deference to an 
agency's resolution of the issue. Indeed, courts have held that Type A adjudica-
tion is mandated only when the relevant statute requires the agency to conduct a 
"hearing on the record."38 In the absence of these magic words, the agency 
generally has discretion to adjudicate outside of the APA. 39 In these circum-
stances, however, the agency could still choose to afford more procedural 
protections than are required by statute by voluntarily conducting Type A 
adjudication.40 In similar fashion, agencies sometimes conduct Type B proceed-
ings even in the absence of any statutory provision requiring a non-APA 
evidentiary hearing.41 
The law imposes few procedural requirements that apply uniformly across 
Type B adjudications, leaving agencies substantial procedural discretion over 
these proceedings. The Constitution's Due Process Clause creates only modest 
34. See Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 27, at 532-34. 
35. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 1579-81 (1947) (Chenery /[); M. Elizabeth Magill, 
Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Cm. L. REv. 1383 (2004). 
36. Absent a clear and unambiguous statutory provision that makes the choice for the agency. 
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). 
38. See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2006); 
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also City of West 
Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983) (assuming that Congress does not intend the APA to 
apply unless it uses the magic words). For example, a provision of the SEC's statute requires APA 
adjudication by providing that "the Commission may impose a civil penalty on a person if the 
Commission finds, on the record, after notice and opportunity for hearing" that the person has 
committed certain violations. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(g)(l) (2012). With language such as this, a court would 
likely hold under Chevron step one that the statute clearly requires a Type A proceeding. 
39. This approach has been criticized for a variety of reasons, including on the grounds that the 
phrase "hearing on the record" does not adequately distinguish between Type A and Type B adjudica-
tions. In both kinds of proceedings, the decision maker is expected to decide based on a record 
compiled through an evidentiary hearing. See AsJMow, supra note 6, at 7. 
40. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 23-24. 
41. See, e.g., EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 13 (explaining that the EEOC operates its Federal 
Sector Hearing Program in the absence of any reference to hearings in the relevant civil rights statutes). 
This reality is at odds with the statement commonly made in administrative law textbooks that agencies 
must be specifically authorized to adjudicate. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & 
VICTORIA F. NOURSE, STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 184 (2014) ("Congress must delegate the capacity to issue adjudicative orders 
having the force of law to the agency."). 
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minimum requirements.42 These minimums are determined through the applica-
tion of a flexible, context-specific analysis. The agency is always the first to 
conduct this analysis and, as a practical matter, often has the last word as to 
what procedure due process requires.43 Similarly, and as noted above, the APA 
has almost nothing to say about the procedures that apply outside of Type A 
adjudications.44 In Type B proceedings, there is often another statute outside of 
the APA that requires an evidentiary hearing. This statute may prescribe adjudi-
catory procedures, sometimes in great detail. Regardless of the procedural detail 
specified by statute, however, Congress ordinarily leaves ample room for the 
agency to design or embellish upon the procedures that will be followed. 
Proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board provide a good example. 
The America Invents Act (AIA) created several different proceedings for test-
ing the validity of patents, specifying somewhat detailed procedures for each.45 
But the AIA also left room for the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to further 
flesh out those procedures by regulation.46 
The nature or category of the adjudicatory proceeding has important implica-
tions for the nature and powers of the presiding official or "decider." As 
previously noted, the presiding official in a Type A proceeding generally must 
be an ALJ. This requirement significantly constrains the agency's discretion to 
design the decider, because the APA 47 and the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment's (OPM) statutes48 and regulations49 provide the design. If a proceeding is 
not required to be a Type A proceeding, an agency nonetheless likely has the 
discretion to appoint ALJs to preside over the proceedings. As a practical 
matter, however, this discretion is constrained by the OPM's role in the selec-
tion and appointment of ALJs.50 More often, in the absence of a statutory 
42. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970). But see, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
43. This phenomenon is frequently referred to as "administrative constitutionalism."' See Bremer & 
Jacobs, supra note 27, at 531. 
44. See supra note 20; see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 873 F.2d 325, 
337 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[N]o provision of the APA contains specific procedures to govern an informal 
agency adjudication .... "). 
45. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
46. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2012) (providing that "[t]he Director shall prescribe regulations" 
addressing various procedural matters in inter partes review proceedings). See generally Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 236 (2015). 
47. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2012) (defining the presiding official's powers). 
48. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1302(a), 1305, 3105, 3304, 3323(b), 3344, 4301(2)(D), 5372, and 7521 
(2012). 
49. See OPM Administrative Law Judge Program 5 C.F.R. pt. 930, subpt. B (2017). 
50. The OPM, following its predecessor's (the Civil Service Commission (CSC)) practice, takes the 
position that ALJs can only be appointed to preside over proceedings that are required by statute or 
regulation to be conducted in accord with the APA. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 27-32. In only 
two instances have agencies used their discretion to appoint ALJs in the absence of a statutory 
requirement to do so. In both instances, the CSC refused to permit the appointments, and congressional 
action ultimately was required to break the impasse. See id. at 11-12. 
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requirement to appoint ALJs, agencies elect to use non-ALJ adjudicators.51 
B. Designing the Decider 
75 
The minimal legal constraints applicable in Type B adjudication leave agen-
cies largely free to "design the decider," i.e., to control the constellation of 
characteristics that define the presiding official. These characteristics can be 
divided into two general categories. The first category includes the various 
characteristics that determine the decider's identity, including the official's title, 
job description, rate of pay, qualifications, and position within the agency. These 
elements directly and indirectly affect the separation of functions within the 
agency, as well as the manner and extent of the decider's accountability. 
Second, an agency has discretion to define the decider's powers. Of particular 
interest here are the powers to collect information, to resolve the dispute, and to 
order remedies. These powers directly affect the nature, basis, and form of the 
adjudicator's decision. 
This Section explores the scope and exercise of these aspects of agency 
procedural discretion. To make the discussion more concrete and to demonstrate 
the variety that agency discretion has yielded, this Section offers examples 
drawn from the ACUS-Stanford database of Type B adjudication programs.52 
The ACUS-Stanford database includes information about the representation of 
private parties, representation of agencies, availability and types of discovery, 
subpoena authority, ex parte contacts, types of hearings and appeals, cross-
examination, information about adjudicators, information about alternative dis-
pute resolution, caseload statistics, number of adjudicators, case types, and 
ability to appeal. Of the 133 agencies included in the database, 87 conduct 
administrative "adjudications" of some kind.53 Most relevant for this Article's 
purposes, the database provides information about presiding officials for 524 
different adjudicatory programs, including 396 programs at the hearing level 
and 128 at the appellate level.54 The ACUS-Stanford database offers a wealth of 
information about these officials, including their employing agency, the name of 
the office within which the adjudicatory program is housed, the adjudicatory 
scheme, the adjudicator's title, and whether the adjudicator is subject to perfor-
mance evaluations, is employed full-time as an adjudication officer, and is 
subject to quality control measures or production goals. 55 It is common for there 
to be more than one kind of decider within a single adjudicatory program. The 
51. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. 
52. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
53. See Agencies, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/agencies [https://perma.cc/ 
PE8G-Q77Q]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012) ("'[O]rder' means the whole or a part of a final 
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter 
other than rule making but including licensing .... "); 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) ('"[A]djudication' means 
agency process for the formulation of an order .... "). 
54. See Information About Adjudicators, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/ 
adjudicators [https://perma.cc/2KWY-B46F]. 
55. See id. 
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database consequently includes information about 784 kinds of adjudicators, 
including 577 at the hearing level and 207 at the appellate level. 56 
1. The Decider's Identity 
Agency discretion to design the decider in Type B adjudication first encom-
passes authority over the characteristics and rules that determine who within the 
agency will preside over hearings. There is great variety in how agencies 
exercise this discretion to define the decider's identity. 
The characteristics that help define the decider's identity include that offi-
cial's title, job description, and rate of pay. In Type B proceedings, the decider is 
often called an "administrative judge" (AJ), although agencies may use any 
other title. 57 There is no cross-cutting legal principal that restricts the range of 
possibilities here.58 Moving beyond the decider's title, the agency also has 
discretion over this person's job description. The job description determines, 
among other things, whether the official is employed full-time as an adjudicator 
or has other, non-adjudicatory responsibilities. In addition, an agency can 
decide whether and how to subject its adjudicators to performance reviews, 
decision-making quotas, or other quality control measures. The agency also 
generally has some control over its adjudicators' rate of pay and eligibility for 
raises.59 
A handful of examples suffice to demonstrate the variation that occurs as a 
result of agency discretion over these three aspects of the decider's identity: 
• A "Hearing Officer" is "a Coast Guard officer or employee who has 
been delegated the authority to assess civil penalties"60 in the context of 
"all statutory penalty provisions that the Coast Guard is authorized to 
enforce."61 Hearing Officers are employed solely as adjudicators and are 
56. See id. ACUS collected the information from publicly available sources such as the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) and then asked individual agencies to verify the information and correct it 
as necessary. Of the 784 entries on adjudicators, only 260 are verified, including 181 at the hearing 
level and 79 at the appellate level. 
57. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
58. It is possible, though rare, that the statute the agency is charged with administering may supply a 
term or title for Type B adjudicators. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012) (referring to "the administrative 
patent judges"' who preside over PTAB proceedings); see also Department of Commerce Hearing-Level 
Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/usdcpate0021-hearing-
level-procedures [https://perma.cc/4PD7-RWGL]. 
59. Government-wide personnel rules, regulations, and policies constrain agency discretion some-
what, although an agency is likely to consider the effect of those rules when it makes the initial decision 
about what kind of employee will adjudicate. OPM is responsible for these personnel rules, regulations, 
and policies. See 5 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (authorizing the President to delegate authority for personnel 
management to OPM). 
60. 33 C.F.R. § l.07-5(b) (2017); see Department of Homeland Security Hearing-Level Procedures, 
ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, http://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/dhsccghp0004-hearing-level-
procedures-O [https://perma.cc/5Y6E-WNNA]. 
61. 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-1 (2017). 
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paid at the Senior Officer rank of Commander (CDR), at the paygrade of 
0-5, which is roughly equivalent to the civilian GS-13 or GS-14.62 
• Under the Department of Veterans Affairs' procurement suspension and 
debarment regulations, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Office of 
Acquisition and Logistics is authorized to adjudicate as the "Suspending 
and Debarring Official (SD0)."63 This official has responsibilities in 
addition to serving as the SDO and is a member of the Senior Executive 
Service (SES). This official is accordingly compensated according to the 
SES pay scale.64 
• In the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) Office of 
Field Programs, within the Federal Sector Hearings Program, an AJ who 
is also known as an "Attorney Examiner" reviews discrimination com-
plaints by federal employees. These officials are employed full-time as 
adjudicators and are paid as GS-12, GS-13, or GS-14 employees.65 
• "Board Judges" preside over hearings held by the Civilian Board of 
Contract Appeals, a division of the General Services Administration 
(GSA) that adjudicates contract disputes between private contractors 
and civilian federal agencies. Board Judges enjoy many of the protec-
tions afforded to ALJs and are employed full-time as adjudicators.66 
77 
62. See 0-5 Basic Pay Rate-Officer Military Payscales, FEDERALPAY.ORG, https://www.federalpay.org/ 
military/grades/o-5 [https://perma.cc/4SRA-3GTQ]. The General Schedule (GS) establishes the base 
pay for civilian federal government employees, which is then adjusted based on locality. See Pay & 
Leave, OPM.Gov, https ://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/2018/ general-
schedule/ [https://perma.cc/UBT2-2GP8]. The GS schedule has 15 "grades"' or levels of pay, and within 
each grade, there are 10 "steps" that allow for pay to be refined according to the employee's years of 
service, etc.: For 2018, the base pay of a GS-13 employee is between $75,628 (at Step I) and $98,317 
(at Step 10), while the base pay of a GS-14 is between $89,370 (at Step I) and $116,181 (at Step 10). 
See Salary Table 2018-GS, https ://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-
tables/pdf/2018/GS. pdf [https :/ /perma.cc/2K6W-MKVN]. 
63. See Department of Veterans Affairs Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https:// 
acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/dovaproc0009-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.cc/KJ6Z-
3JU9]; 48 C.F.R. § 9.403 (2017). These officials are vested with discretion to refer fact-finding to 
another presiding official, who conducts the evidentiary hearing and issues written findings of fact. See 
48 CFR 9.406-3(d)(2), 9.407-3(d)(2) (2017). The regulations otherwise provide no guidance or 
requirements for the presiding official. 
64. See Senior Executive Compensation, OPM.Gov, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-
executive-service/compensation [https://perma.cc/T3VK-YFJC]. For 2018, the SES pay scale is be-
tween $126,148 and $189,600. See Executive Order 13819, Adjustments to Certain Rates of Pay (Dec. 
22, 2017), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/pay-executive-order-
2018-adjustments-of-certain-rates-of-pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YWF-J4KJ]. 
65. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RE-
SEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/eeocfeds0002-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma. 
cc/45S2-TU9E]; see also supra note 62 (discussing the GS pay scale and the rates of pay for GS-13 and 
GS-14 employees). The 2018 base pay for a GS-12 employee is between $63,600 (at Step I) and 
$82,680 (at Step 10). See Salary Table 2018-GS, supra note 62. 
66. See AsIMow, supra note 6, at 40; General Services Administration Hearing-Level Procedures, 
ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/gsaocbca0004-hearing-level-
procedures-0 [https://perma.cc/R4NB-Y755]. The CA pay scale establishes a salary of $164,200 for the 
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They are compensated on the Contract Appeals (CA) pay plan in the 
range of 1-3.67 
• The "Chief Financial Officer" and "Deputy Chief Financial Officer" 
preside over proceedings involving a debtor's request for review of a 
Notice of Debt Collection regarding a delinquent debt owed to the 
United States Peace Corps. These officials are not employed full-time as 
adjudicators and therefore have other responsibilities.68 They are paid 
according to the Department of State's Foreign Service pay scale.69 
This short list merely hints at the diversity among deciders. Other titles for 
non-ALJ adjudicators include "Examiner,"70 "Hearing Officer,"71 "Judgment 
Officer,"72 "Presiding Officer,"73 and "Special Master."74 As the discussion 
above demonstrates, there is also seemingly limitless variety with respect the 
job responsibilities, oversight, and salary levels of Type B adjudicators. 75 
Agencies may also establish employment qualifications, another important 
aspect of the decider's identity. These include basic qualifications unrelated to 
the agency's specific statutory mission, such as whether the decider is an 
Chairman of the Board, $159,274 for the Vice Chairman, and $154,348 for other members of the 
Board. See Salary Table for Members of the Boards of Contract Appeals, https://www.opm.gov/policy-
data-oversight/pay-leave/ salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2018/BCA. pdf [https :/ /perma. cc/N 5FV-
YHSB]. 
67. See General Services Administration Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, supra 
note 66. 
68. See United States Peace Corps Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus. 
law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/pecodebt0002-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.cc/6LUP-PEF5]. 
69. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2018 FOREIGN SERVICE (FS) SALARY TABLE (2018), https://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/277016.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4BP-8REH]. The Deputy Chief Financial Offi-
cer is paid at Class 1 of the FS pay scale, with base pay ranging from $105,123 (at Step 1) to $13,659 
(at Step 14), while the Chief Financial Officer is a Senior Foreign Service official whose pay range is 
between $126,148 and $189,600. See id. 
70. See Overseas Private Investment Corporation Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RE-
SEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/opicpemp000l-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma. 
cc/4WN6-P28C]. 
71. See Department of Agriculture Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus. 
law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/usdanado0002-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.cc/5ZS2-G5A6]. 
To comply with an 8th Circuit decision on the matter, Lane v. USDA, 120 F.3d 106 (8th Cir. 1997), 
USDA treats this as a Type A program, but by statute the presiding officials are not ALJs, see AsIMow, 
supra note 6, at 36-37. 
72. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RE-
SEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/cftcrepa0005-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma. 
cc/LC72-J9M4]. 
73. See Department of Housing and Urban Development Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION 
RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/hudomanu0004-hearing-level-procedures [https:// 
perma.cc/SYN7-LHHQ]. 
74. See Department of Justice Hearing-Level Procedures, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law. 
stanford.edu/hearing-level/dojxvcfx0009-hearing-level-procedures [https :/ /perma.cc/ APF2-VKGS]. 
75. Just in the short list provided here, four separate pay scales are used, and the pay range is 
breathtakingly broad, ranging from a low of $63,700 to a high of $189,600. 
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attorney.76 In addition, Type B agencies may require certain technical or subject 
matter expertise or experience as a precondition for employment. 77 For ex -
ample, the EEOC requires the AJs in its Federal Sector Hearing Program to 
have specialized knowledge and experience with the civil rights laws.78 Simi-
larly, GSA requires its Board Judges to have a minimum of five years of 
experience with public contract law. 79 In some instances, Congress has directed 
an agency to employ adjudicators who have specialized qualifications. For 
example, the AIA directed the PTO to hire as administrative patent judges 
"persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability," a statutory 
directive that the PTO has implemented by employing administrative patent 
judges with the expertise necessary to determine patent validity. 80 
These matters are neither superficial nor insignificant: they determine the 
adjudicator's role and position within the agency. Job descriptions and qualifica-
tions may affect whether an adjudicator has responsibilities in addition to 
presiding over hearings. This may have implications for the separation of 
functions within the agency. Salary decisions, performance reviews, quality 
control measures, and production goals may improve the decider's accountabil-
ity, undermine the decider's independence, or both. 81 
Agencies also have discretion to address these higher-level considerations 
directly through rules designed to preserve the separation of functions and to 
promote decider accountability. Separation of functions rules may prohibit an 
adjudicator from having certain other responsibilities, such as a role in investigat-
ing, prosecuting, or advocating in the cases they will later decide. Many-but 
not all-agencies authorized to perform these various functions have regula-
tions designed to separate them. 82 Agencies also have discretion to design how 
an officer's initial adjudicatory decision will be subject to reconsideration, 
review, or appeal. 83 The agency may reserve for itself the authority to make the 
final decision, regardless of the initial decision provided by the adjudicator. 84 
76. In APA adjudication, by contrast, OPM is instead vested with the authority to determine the 
ALJ's qualifications. See 5 U.S.C. § 5372(b)(2) (2012); see also 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-930.211 (2017) 
(OPM regulations implementing its statutory authority to regulate the selection, compensation, and 
tenure of ALJs employed by other agencies). 
77. Barnett, supra note 4, at 1667. 
78. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 31. 
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
80. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
81. Cf Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 323, 
331 (2003) (stating that "judicial independence and judicial accountability are different sides of the 
same coin"'). 
82. See AsrMow, supra note 6, at 21-22. 
83. The Administrative Conference has recommended that "[a]gencies that decide a significant 
number of cases should use adjudicators-rather than agency heads, boards, or panels-to conduct 
hearings and provide initial decisions, subject to higher-level review." Admin. Conf. of the U.S., 
Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,316 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
84. Indeed, even in Type A adjudication, the APA expressly reserves to the agency the power to 
make the final decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) ("On appeal from or review of the initial 
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2. The Decider's Powers 
In Type B adjudication, the agency's discretion to design the decider also 
includes the ability to define that official's powers.85 First, agencies may adopt a 
variety of rules that determine what information is contained in the hearing 
record and is otherwise available to the decider. For example, some agencies 
empower adjudicators to order pre-hearing discovery, while other agencies do 
not. 86 In a similar fashion, some agencies empower adjudicators to keep informa-
tion submitted by the parties confidential, while other agencies do not. Most, 
but not all, Type B agencies adopt regulations regarding the decider's ability to 
engage in ex parte communications. 87 These regulations address whether and in 
what circumstances the adjudicator may communicate with persons outside the 
hearing, including with other staff within the agency. 88 Although ex parte rules 
are best known for protecting the integrity of the process and promoting the 
separation of functions, these rules also affect what kind of information is 
available to the presiding official. 
A second type of rules that define the decider's powers relate to the nature, 
basis, and format of the adjudicator's decision. Agency regulations may em-
power the presiding official to adjudicate for a class89 or resolve disputes on 
summary judgment.90 Other regulations may grant the decider remedial powers, 
address the finality of the decision, or require that the decision be in writing.91 
As previously explained, a Type B adjudication is, by definition, one in which 
the exclusive record principle is observed. This is a matter of definition, 
however, and not of legal requirement. For this reason, the ACUS study was 
able to identify some Type B agencies that lack any publicly available, written 
decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it 
may limit the issues on notice or by rule."'). 
85. There are certain powers, such as the authority to issue subpoenas that an agency can give to its 
adjudicators only if Congress has first given that power to the agency. For example, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowered the EEOC to issue administrative subpoenas, and the EEOC has in 
turn granted that power to its federal sector adjudicators. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (2012); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 161(1) (2012); Alison B. Marshall & Jennifer C. Everett, EEOC Subpoena Power, 37 EMP. RELATIONS 
L.J. 3 (2011) (reviewing issues that arise in recent cases addressing the scope of the EEOC's subpoena 
power). 
86. See As1Mow, supra note 6, at 35. 
87. See id. at 20-21. 
88. For example, EEOC's federal sector hearing procedures do not prohibit ex parte communica-
tions, although such a prohibition is found in an EEOC order. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10 
& n.58; EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY CoMM'N, ORDER No. 690.001 (Jan. 30, 2002); see also EQUAL EMP'T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, HANDBOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES ch. 1 pt. E (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
federal/ajhandbook.cfm#initial [https://perma.cc/4RXM-YX7L]. 
89. See Michael Sant' Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE 
L.J. 1634 (2017); Michael Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 
CoLuM. L. REv. 1992 (2012). 
90. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 70-3, Summary Decision in Administrative 
Adjudication, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,785 (July 23, 1973). 
91. See As1Mow, supra note 6, at 32-33. 
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rule requiring observance of the exclusive record principle.92 As with agency 
discretion to define the decider's identity, agency discretion over the decider's 
power yields broad diversity across Type B programs. 
Ill. REEVALUATING PROCEDURAL DISCRETION 
Agency discretion to design the decider thus gives an agency control over the 
constellation of discrete elements that determine the nature, position, and 
powers of the officials who preside over adjudicatory hearings. This discretion 
offers benefits to agencies, regulated parties, and the public. But its exercise 
also imposes costs, both at the level of individual adjudicatory programs and 
from a broader, system-wide perspective. 
A. Benefits of Procedural Discretion 
The principal-and most frequently invoked-benefit of agency procedural 
discretion is that it enables an agency to design its processes in a manner best 
suited to meet the unique needs of that agency and the regulatory program at 
issue. This approach is grounded in the concept of comparative institutional 
advantage. It takes as its premise the notion that the agency is better positioned 
than Congress or the courts to select the optimal procedural design. 93 As 
Professor Asimow has explained: "[ w ]hether a particular procedural device 
should be employed (and the precise form in which it is provided) always 
requires a careful balance of the conflicting variables involved in choosing 
optimal procedures-accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability to the parties. "94 
Although it may seem strange to refer to the presiding official as a "procedural 
device," the question of who within an agency will preside over a hearing and 
issue the agency's first (and perhaps final) decision is a central component of the 
overall procedural design. For this reason, it is properly subject to the flexible, 
context-specific analysis that governs other questions of procedural design in 
administrative adjudication. 
This approach implicitly recognizes a link between administrative procedure 
and substantive regulatory policy.95 To recognize such a link is consistent with 
the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee, which treated procedural 
discretion as derivative of an agency's substantive statutory authority.96 Con-
gress also seems to recognize a relationship between substance and procedure. 
92. See AsIMow, supra note 6, at 35. As Professor Asimow notes, it is possible that these agencies 
adhere to the principle without having codified it in a procedural regulation, manual, or other source of 
procedural law. Id. 
93. See Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 27, at 541-42. 
94. AsrMow, supra note 6, at 19. 
95. See, e.g., Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 27, at 526 ("Procedural choices are inextricably 
intertwined with substantive ends."'). 
96. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978) (holding that the Commission acted within its statutory authority when it considered the 
environmental impact of spent fuel processes in licensing procedures). 
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When it has enacted agency-and program-specific procedural statutes that devi-
ate from the APA's adjudication structure, it has often done so in the service of 
substantive ends. For example, the AIA created detailed, patent-specific adjudica-
tory processes for a variety of patent-related reasons, including to facilitate the 
invalidation and narrowing of certain patents thought to interfere with innova-
tion and economic growth.97 The appointment of expert "administrative patent 
judges" was one aspect of this substantively-focused procedural reform.98 Fi-
nally, agencies also seem to view procedural discretion as a valuable and 
necessary component of their substantive statutory authority. Procedures (in 
adjudication and in connection with other kinds of agency action) are often 
carefully crafted with an eye toward improving an agency's ability to efficiently 
and effectively achieve its regulatory or other substantive mission. The EEOC's 
practice of hiring administrative judges with civil rights experience to preside 
over federal sector hearings is one example of how agency discretion to design 
the decider can be used to further an agency's substantive mission.99 
A secondary benefit of procedural discretion is that it enables agencies to 
offer greater procedural protections than would otherwise be required by law. 
As previously explained, adjudication outside of the APA offers few procedural 
protections to those whose interests are at stake in the proceedings. Even when 
there are powerful normative reasons to impose additional procedures on admin-
istrative agencies, Congress often lacks the political will to do it. ' 00 In the 
absence of congressional action, however, procedural discretion empowers 
agencies to independently and voluntarily take action to improve administrative 
procedure. 101 Agencies will not always (and perhaps should not always) take 
the most procedurally protective path. 102 For example, agencies have histori-
cally avoided appointing ALJs whenever possible. 103 Nonetheless, the agencies' 
ability to be procedurally innovative and progressive benefits regulated parties 
and the public. 
97. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 242, 255 (explaining that one of the many goals of the AIA 
was to weed out invalid patents and narrow their claims). 
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
99. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 10, at 31. 
100. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 2, at 1008-09 ("The public would benefit if more cases were 
heard by ALJs because ALJs enjoy both de jure and de facto independence of the agencies for which 
they decide cases. It is unlikely, however, that Congress will be persuaded to do so in the foreseeable 
future."'). 
101. This is the premise of many ACUS recommendations, including the recent recommendation on 
evidentiary hearings conducted outside of the APA. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 
2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 
94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016); see also, e.g., Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2011-5, Incorpora-
tion by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012) (urging agencies to voluntarily take action to 
improve the online availability of copyrighted materials incorporated by reference into federal 
regulations). 
102. See Verkuil, supra note 10. 
103. See Asimow, supra note 2, at 1009 & n.36. 
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B. Costs of Procedural Discretion 
The first potential cost of agency discretion to design the decider is that it 
may imperil decider independence. An agency's ability to set the terms of its 
adjudicators' employment gives that agency some measure of influence over 
how those officials decide the matters that come before them. Agency authority 
to subject adjudicators to performance reviews, quality control measures, or 
decision-making quotas similarly gives the agency some control over the deci-
sion-making process. This control may offer improved accountability. But the 
flipside is that it erodes the decider's independence. This is precisely why the 
APA took these aspects of control over ALJs away from adjudicating agencies 
and vested them instead in the Civil Service Commission and its successor, 
OPM. 104 A Type B agency's ability to require its adjudicators to have certain 
subject matter expertise as a condition of employment presents a similar 
problem. Having a specialized decider may have benefits. 105 But it also in-
creases the likelihood that adjudicators will come to their jobs with well-
formed, preexisting commitments and beliefs about the optimal policy to be 
enforced through agency adjudication. This is why OPM does not permit 
agencies to require subject matter expertise as a condition of ALJ appoint-
ment. 106 Furthermore, the role of a Type B adjudicator is "to preside impartially 
over fair hearings that implement and administer agency policy." 107 In other 
words, the adjudicator's "role demands adherence to agency policy and goals," 108 
and not independence in the judicial sense. This may hold true regardless of the 
precise details of how a particular agency has elected to exercise its discretion 
to design the decider. Finally, all of these issues may be further compounded if 
the hearing structure contemplates that the adjudicator's employer (i.e., the 
agency) will always and necessarily be one of the parties to the hearing. 109 For 
these reasons, reduced independence may be inherent in the administrative 
104. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (holding that federal executive officials 
entitled to qualified immunity and persons performing adjudicatory functions are entitled to absolute 
immunity from damages); Ramspeck v. Trial Exam'r Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953); Nash v. 
Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14-16 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that alleged invasion of ALJ's statutory right to 
decisional independence was justiciable controversy and there was standing); Asimow, supra note 2, at 
1009. OPM also ensures that all ALJs are paid according to a special pay scale, according to which 
compensation is both higher than the GS scale and is not subject to the adjudicating agency's control. 
See 5 C.F.R. § 930.205 (2017); Pay & Leave: Pay Administration, OPM.Gov, https://www.opm.gov/ 
policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/administrative-law-judge-pay-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/HFS3-26Y7]. 
105. Cf J. Jonas Anderson, Judicial Lobbying, 91 WASH. L. REv. 401, 456-57 (2016) (noting benefits 
of specialized judges). 
106. Agencies were once permitted to require ALJs to have specialized experience as a condition of 
appointment. The process was called "selective certification," and it was heavily criticized and 
ultimately abandoned. See John T. Miller, Jr., The Vice of Selective Certification in the Appointment of 
Hearing Examiners, 20 ADMJN. L. REv. 477 (1968). 
107. Moliterno, supra note 23, at 1192. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1195. 
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justice that can be offered through non-APA adjudication. 110 
From a system-wide perspective, the exercise of agency discretion to design 
the decider defeats the APA's purpose of promoting procedural uniformity 
across agencies. 111 In Type A adjudication, OPM's centralized authority over the 
certification, selection, appointment, and tenure of ALJs promotes substantial 
uniformity across agencies. 112 The APA's adjudication provisions also promote 
uniformity by (among other things) specifying the ALJ's core powers. 113 In 
adjudication outside the APA, where agencies have discretion over these ele-
ments, uniformity is nowhere to be found. Indeed, Professor Asimow describes 
"the world of Type B adjudication" as being "wildly diverse" 114 and "vast and 
formless," 115 while Type C adjudication is "even more wildly diverse." 116 
Indeed, the ACUS-Stanford database does not include information about Type C 
adjudication schemes because such information about them is so voluminous, 
varied, and difficult to find. 117 This reality makes it very difficult to assess 
whether and to what extent agency adjudication is-in the aggregate-
consistent with basic due process norms. In connection with this, and harkening 
back to the principal benefits of procedural discretion, it is not clear that 
agencies have special expertise in determining what due process requires. 
Agencies may have the advantage in tailoring adjudicatory processes to the 
needs of individual regulatory programs. But that is not the kind of expertise 
that is relevant in balancing due process values to ensure an adequate level of 
decider independence. 
This hints at a third, derivative cost of agency discretion to design the 
decider: the diversity it facilitates makes non-APA adjudication significantly 
less transparent than Type A adjudication. In Type B adjudication, information 
must always be agency-specific, and the details of individual adjudicatory 
programs are often difficult to find, scattered across various sources, or simply 
not written down in any publicly available location. 118 This is why studying 
federal administrative adjudication in the aggregate is such a daunting prospect 
for scholars and experts. Even agencies themselves may not have access to 
adequate information about adjudicatory procedures, a reality that would make 
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it difficult for them to thoughtfully develop and maintain those procedures. This 
can be contrasted to the world of informal rulemaking, which is made uniform 
through APA-prescribed procedures that have been fleshed out by judicial case 
law. These sources of law create a clear conception of informal rulemaking. By 
contrast, there is no single, clear, uniform understanding of what constitutes 
adjudication outside of the APA. This makes it impossible for affected parties to 
have clear procedural expectations. It also prevents a system-wide evaluation of 
the integrity of administrative adjudication. These problems deserve greater 
attention. 
CONCLUSION 
Agency procedural discretion in Type B adjudication has contributed to the 
emergence of a vast and formless world of administrative adjudication outside 
of the APA. Agency discretion to design the decider is illustrative of this larger 
phenomenon. In this context, procedural discretion may simply be a natural 
consequence of the legal reality that Congress has vested the agency with the 
authority to adjudicate. 119 And the resulting specialization conveys some ben-
efits. But it also imposes costs-to decider independence, uniformity, and 
transparency. These costs have been acknowledged, but they deserve greater 
attention. Individual agencies can adhere to best practices that can help to 
mitigate these costs within individual adjudicatory programs. 12° Congressional 
action may be necessary, however, to address the issues on a system-wide basis. 
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